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If  the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; 
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy…to 
declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the 
conviction of  a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution1.2
AbstrAct
The dual aims of  this paper are (1) to assert that the United States’ ex-
traordinary rendition program stands in stark contrast to its international 
obligations under the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Torture Convention”), and (2) to 
suggest that providing specific civil remedies to the individuals who endured 
the program’s effects will provide deterrence from continuing the program. 
First, this paper defines the extraordinary rendition program and explains 
how it originated. Second, this paper argues that the extraordinary rendition 
program’s costs outweigh its benefits in the War on Terror through a speci-
fic focus on how it violates the Torture Convention and invites retribution. 
Finally, this paper sets forth changes to create disincentives for using the 
program – namely, altering the state secrets privilege and allowing corpora-
tions involved with the program to be sued – and suggests that returning to 
older practices such as irregular rendition could adequately meet the goals 
of  extraordinary rendition with fewer human rights violations.  
introduction
An American citizen waits patiently in an airport terminal in Jordan for a 
flight back to the United States.  Several men – Jordanian officials – are wa-
tching the American and waiting for the right moment to approach him.  The 
American gets up and starts to walk away, perhaps to get a cup of  coffee.  The 
Jordanian officials stop the American quickly and take him to a secluded part 
of  the airport.  For the next several days, the Jordanians question the Ameri-
can relentlessly, trying to discover his connection to the torture of  hundreds of  
Muslim and Middle Eastern individuals.  They do not let him call the American 
consulate, an attorney, or any of  his family members.  After several days of  non-
-stop interrogation, the Jordanians tell the American he is going home.  They 
turn the American over to a group of  Pakistani men who blindfold him, take 
him to a secluded airstrip, beat him, sodomize him, and sedate him before they 
put him on the plane.  When the American regains full consciousness, he realizes 
that he is not in America.  Instead, he is somewhere in Eastern Europe, forced 
1  United States v. Toscanino
2 United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 1974)(quoting Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438 at 484-485 (1928)).
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to spend the majority of  his time locked in a very small 
underground cell.  
For the next year, the American withstands severe inter-
rogation techniques by the Pakistani men, who are members 
of  Pakistan’s intelligence agency.  These agents keep the 
American naked and exposed most of  the time.3  On inter-
rogation days, the Pakistani intelligence officers beat him, 
wall him,4 and force him into stress positions.  The American 
endures sleep deprivation and waterboarding.  The Pakistani 
intelligence officers specifically designed each extreme inter-
rogation technique used to create the dependence necessary 
to collecting intelligence in a sustainable way.5
Finally, the Pakistanis release the American, broken af-
ter the year of  unmitigated suffering.  The American has 
precious few opportunities to receive a remedy for the 
yearlong torture and interrogation he endured in Pakistani 
custody.  The Pakistani courts refuse to hear the case be-
cause it could endanger national security, and the Pakistani 
government claims that the acts were not violations of  the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the “Torture 
Convention”)6 because they did not take place in Pakistan. 
Although American citizens have not faced scena-
rios like the one described above, American officers 
and agents have carried out missions similar to the one 
described above.  This process, known as extraordinary 
3 See International Committee of  the Red Cross Report on the 
Treatment of  Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody 
(Feb. 2007) assets.nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-
report.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (“The most common method 
of  ill-treatment noted during the interviews with the fourteen was 
the use of  nudity.  Eleven of  the fourteen alleged that they were 
subjected to extended periods of  nudity during detention and in-
terrogation, ranging from several weeks continuously up to several 
months intermittently.”)
4 See Scott Horton, New CIA Docs Detail Brutal “Extraordinary 
Rendition” Process (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2009/08/28/new-cia-docs-detail-bruta_n_271299.htm 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2012)( “‘Coercive techniques’ used include: wall-
ing (slamming a prisoner’s head against the wall, with some protec-
tive measures to avoid serious injuries)...”) [hereinafter Horton]
5 See Background Paper on CIA’s Combined Use of  Interroga-
tion Techniques (Dec. 30, 2004) www.aclu.org/torturefoia/re-
leased/082409/oclremand/2004olc97.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 
2012) (“The goal of  interrogation is to create a state of  learned 
helplessness and dependence conducive to the collection of  intel-
ligence in a predictable, reliable, and sustainable manner.”)
6 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 
1985, S. Treaty Doc. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force 
June 26, 1987.
rendition,7 occurs when the government agents of  one 
nation to take physical custody of  an individual and bring 
that person into another country for intense interrogation 
outlawed by the abducting nation’s laws.  Over the last 
twenty years, American officials have used extraordinary 
rendition to break up terrorist cells in the Middle East, to 
prevent these groups from engaging in more terrorist at-
tacks, and to circumvent bringing any of  these individuals 
into the United States for a criminal trial.  
Born out of  a policy known as irregular rendition, 
this particularly extreme procedure may help bring 
about enormous results in America’s War on Terror, 
but it leaves the United States vulnerable in a variety 
of  ways.  The Torture Convention does not allow an 
individual to be tortured for any reason.8  Even beyond 
the breaches to the Torture Convention, the process of  
extraordinary rendition is diplomatically volatile and is 
more likely to result in retaliation and retribution.9  As 
a result, the United States’ current support and practi-
ce of  extraordinary rendition for suspected terrorists is 
more dangerous than its potential results are worth.  
This paper argues that the United States should 
stop using extraordinary rendition as a method to gain 
information from suspected terrorists.  The extraordi-
nary rendition program comes with detrimental rami-
fications in the international community – far beyond 
justifying any potential value.  Instead, the United States 
government needs to create disincentives to continue 
the program in its current state through a variety of  
legal remedies for extraordinary rendition survivors.  In 
addition, the United States government could revert to 
former programs that do not violate human rights.
Part I of  this paper provides an overview and expla-
nation of  America’s policy on rendition.  Specifically, 
Part I describes the two different types of  extraordinary 
rendition – rendition to other countries for interroga-
tion and rendition to American-run black sites.10  Addi-
7 See David Weissbrodt and Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition 
and the Torture Convention, 46 va. J. int’l l. 585, 586-87 (Summer 
2006).
8 Torture Convention, supra note 5, Art. 2, ¶ 2.
9 Toscanino, supra note 1. (“If  the government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a 
law unto himself; it invites anarchy…to declare that the government 
may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of  a private 
criminal— would bring terrible retribution.”)
10 See Ingrid Detter Frankopan, Extraordinary Rendition and the Law 
of  War, 33 n.C. J. int’l l. & Com. reg. 657, 675-77 (Summer 2008).
Some detainees are, according to reports, taken through secret de-
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tionally, this section follows the civil suit filed by El-
-Masri, an innocent man subjected to an extraordinary 
rendition and torture at a black site. 
Part II argues why the extraordinary rendition 
program’s cost outweighs any potential benefits to the 
War on Terrorism.  Specifically, this section shows how 
the program violates the Torture Convention, despi-
te American arguments to the contrary.  Additionally, 
this section argues that through violating the Tortu-
re Convention and inviting retribution, extraordinary 
rendition’s costs outweigh the benefits.
Finally, Part III suggests ways to create disincentives 
for extraordinary rendition as an effort to rectify the da-
mage caused by its use.  The American government can 
alter how the judicial system treats the civil suits brought 
by extraordinary rendition’s victims and, thus, establish di-
sincentives for the program.  This section also argues that 
the American government could achieve its preventative 
goals better by returning to older practices. Finally, this 
section argues that the Committee Against Torture must 
amend the Torture Convention to prevent further confu-
sion on what is or is not a violation under its obligations.
1. AmericAn extrAordinAry rendition
Extraordinary rendition occurs when government 
agents from one country detain an individual suspec-
ted to be a terrorist in another country, kidnap that 
individual, and deliver him to yet another country for 
torturous interrogation.11  In terms of  American poli-
tention centres: so called “black sites” are normally used by CIA in 
cooperation with other governments.  These sites have been claimed 
to exist in Afghanistan at the Bagram Air Base and in Iraq at Camp 
Cropper . . . . Black sites are also alleged to exist in Egypt, and Mo-
rocco, for example in the al-Tamara interrogation centre near Rabat. 
In Thailand, the Voice of  America relay station in Udon Thani has 
been said to host a black site.  Claims have also been made that 
black sites have existed in several European countries, especially in 
the post-communist states, such as Poland, at Mihail Kogalniceanu 
near Constanta, in Romania, Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, Bulgaria and 
Slovakia.  Not only ex-communist states states have been implicated, 
but many Western states have been accused of  tolerating activities 
by the CIA including, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germa-
ny, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom.
11 Frankopan, supra note 9; see Margaret L. Satterthwaite, De-
Torturing the Logic: the Contribution of  CAT General Comment 2 to the 
Debate Over Extraordinary Rendition, 11 n.y. City l. rev. 281 (Sum-
mer 2008); see Elizabeth Rose Bailey, Controlling Government Secrecy: 
A Judicial Solution to the Internal and External Conflicts Surrounding the 
cy, this practice grew out of  another practice known as 
irregular rendition.  An irregular rendition occurs when 
officers or agents of  one country enter another country, 
abduct a suspected criminal, and return that person to 
their country so that he or she can face criminal prose-
cution.  Extraordinary rendition and irregular rendition 
are both problematic alternatives to extradition because 
they circumvent the internationally accepted processes 
for gaining control of  another country’s citizens.
What began as a model of  the “bad capture, good 
detention” thought for gaining jurisdiction over a sus-
pected criminal has evolved into even larger, more 
extreme exertion of  American authority.  The United 
States government employed two forms of  extraordi-
nary rendition over the last twenty years.  These two 
forms need to be distinguished from each other.  The 
following subsections distinguish the two forms of  ex-
traordinary rendition and highlight rendition to black si-
tes as the most severe and problematic.  The last subsec-
tion documents the experiences of  one individual who 
endured captivity in an American run black site facility. 
1.1 Extraordinary Rendition With Assurances
Under the first extraordinary rendition form, Ame-
rican agents detain suspected terrorists anywhere in the 
State Secrets Privilege, 58 BUff. l. rev. 1187(December 2010); see Peter 
Johnston, Leaving the Invisible Universe: Why All Victims of  Extraordi-
nary Rendition Need a Cause of  Action Against the United States, 16 J.l. 
& Pol’y 357 (2007); see Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, 
Torture, and Other Nightmares From the War on Terror, 75 geo. waSH. 
l. rev. 1200 (August 2007); see Astineh Arakelian, Extraordinary Ren-
dition in the Wake of  9/11, 40 Sw. l. rev. 323 (2010); see Melanie 
M. Laflin, Kidnapped Terrorists: Bringing International Criminals to Justice 
Through Irregular Rendition and Other Quasi-Legal Options, 26 J. legiS. 
315 (2000); see A. John Radsan, A More Regular Process for Irregular 
Rendition, 37 Seton Hall l. rev. 1 (2006); see John P. Blanc, A Total 
Eclipse of  Human Rights – Illustrated by Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 
Inc., 114 w. va. l. rev. 1089 (Spring 2012); see Leila Nadya Sadat, 
Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under Interna-
tional Law, 37 CaSe w. reS. J. int’l l. 309 (2006); see Erin E. Bohan-
non, Breaking the Silence: A Challenge to Executive Use of  the State Secrets 
Privilege to Dismiss Claims, 65 U. miami l. rev. 621 (Winter 2011); see 
Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of  State Secrets, 159 U. Pa. l. rev. 77 
(December 2010); see Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: 
Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of  Law, 75 geo. waSH. l. rev. 
1333 (August 2007); see Michael Byers, Helmut Philipp Aust. Complicity 
and the Law of  State Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
23 eUr. J. int’l l. 586 (May 2012); see William Magnuson, The Domes-
tic Politics of  International Extradition, 52 va. J. int’l l. 839 (Summer 
2012); see David Weissbrodt and Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendi-
tion and the Humanitarian Law of  War and Occupation, 47 va. J. int’l l. 
295 (Winter 2007).
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world and release them into the custody of  other coun-
tries such as Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Afghanistan.12  The 
United States agents then ask the receiving countries for 
assurances that the suspected terrorist detainees will not 
be tortured.13  The Committee Against Torture determi-
ned that these assurances are insufficient to prevent any 
country from violating the Convention.14
1.2 Extraordinary Rendition to Black Sites
Black sites are the second form of  American ex-
traordinary rendition.15  These black sites are CIA-esta-
blished facilities set up and operated in the Middle East 
and in Europe by Americans.16  While in one of  the bla-
12 See ACLU Fact Sheet: Extraordinary Rendition (Dec. 6, 2005), 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/fact-sheet-extraordi-
nary-rendition (last visited Sept. 23, 2012)(“ Foreign nationals sus-
pected of  terrorism have been transported to detention and inter-
rogation facilities in Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Diego Garcia, Afghanistan, 
Guantánamo, and elsewhere.”).
13 See Stephen Grey, Frontline: Extraordinary Rendition (No-
vember 7, 2007), http://pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/ren-
dition701/video/video_index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2012)( 
“They claim that when they send terror suspects to other countries, 
they get assurances they won’t be tortured, but even former CIA 
officials admit those claims are worthless.”), (“’You can say we asked 
them not to do it, but you have to be honest with yourself  and say 
there’s no way we can guarantee they are going to do that,’ says Tyler 
Drumheller, who ran CIA operations in Europe at the time Abu 
Omar was kidnapped and ‘rendered’ to Egypt. ‘Once you turn them 
over you have no control over that.’”); See Fact Sheet, supra note 11. 
(Robert Baer: “If  you want a serious interrogation, you send a pris-
oner to Jordan.  If  you want them to be tortured, you send them to 
Syria.  If  you want someone to disappear – never to see them again 
– you send them to Egypt.”)
14 See Torture Convention, supra note 5, Art. 17; See Weiss-
brodt, supra note 6, quoting Agiza v. Sweden, Communication No. 
233/2003, May 20, 2005, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003. (“[I]
t was known or should have been known, to [Sweden]’s authorities 
at the time of  complainant’s removal that Egypt resorted to consist-
ent and widespread use of  torture against detainees, and that the 
risk of  such treatment was particularly high in the case of  detainees 
held for political and security reasons.”); See Torture Convention, 
supra note 5, at Art. 3 (“[n]o State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) 
or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of  being subjected 
to torture.”).
15 See Grey, supra note 12 (After the war began in Afghanistan in 
2002, the CIA set up its first secret jails or “black sites.” “The dark 
prison was run by the Americans,” a former inmate, Bisher al-Rawi, 
tells Grey. “It wasn’t Afghani people flying the aircraft, it wasn’t Af-
ghani people who sort of  shackled me and did whatever they did to 
me. It was Americans.”)
16 See Grey, supra note 12 (One of  them, located just outside 
Kabul, was known as the “dark prison.” By early 2003, the United 
States was negotiating secret agreements with governments in East-
ern Europe to set up black sites on their territory. A report this 
ck site prisons, detainees experience a series of  phases 
that build up to interrogation.17
Suspected terrorists can be detained anywhere in the 
world by any country before they are turned over to 
CIA agents.  The CIA agents then render the “high va-
lue detainee” to a black site,18 where he “finds himself  
in the complete control of  Americans.”19  Agents sha-
ve the detainees before photographing them naked and 
evaluating them during the Initial Conditions phase.20 
The second phase, Transition to Interrogation, allows 
interrogators to determine how receptive the each de-
tainee is to turning over information.21  Because of  a 
very high standard for willingness to provide informa-
tion, most detainees become tracked for an intense level 
of  interrogation.22  
During the final, full-blown Interrogation phase, 
interrogators use a variety of  techniques to achieve a 
learned dependence goal.23  Interrogators expose the 
detainees to white noise, loud noises, and constant light 
during the interrogation.24  The detainees endure pro-
longed nakedness, sleep deprivation, and stay on a liquid 
diet.25  Interrogators use physical force on the detainees, 
including: slaps,26 walling,27 “water dousing,”28 stress 
summer by the Council of  Europe declared it had proof  of  two 
CIA black sites, one on the east coast of  Romania, the other at an 
airbase in Poland.)
17 See CIA Report, supra note 4 (“[T]he interrogation process can 
be broken into three separate phases: Initial Conditions; Transition 
to Interrogation; and Interrogation.”).
18 See CIA Report, supra note 4 (“The HVD is flown to a Black 
Site[.]  A medical examination is conducted prior to the flight.  Dur-
ing the flight, the detainee is securely shackled and is deprived of  
sight and sound through the use of  blindfolds, earmuffs, and hoods. 
There is no interaction with the HVD during this rendition move-
ment except for periodic, discreet assessments by the on-board 
medical officer.”).
19 See CIA Report, supra note 4, page 3.
20 See CIA Report, supra note 4, page 3.
21 See CIA Report, supra note 4, page 4.
22 See CIA Report, supra note 4, (“The  standard on participation 
is set very high during the Initial Interview.  The HVD would have 
to willingly provide information on actionable threats and location 
information on High-Value Targets at large – not lower level infor-
mation – for interrogators to continue with the neutral approach.”)
23 See CIA Report, supra note 4.
24 See CIA Report, supra note 4, page 5.
25 See CIA Report, supra note 4, page 6.
26 See CIA Report, supra note 4, page 6.
27 See Horton, supra note 3.
28 See CIA Report, footnote 4, supra, (“The frequency and dura-
tion of  water dousing applications are based on water temperature 
and other safety considerations as established by OMS guidelines.  It 
is an effective interrogation technique and may be used frequently 
within those guidelines.  The physical dynamics of  water dousing 
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positions,29 wall standing,30 and cramped confinement.31 
Additionally, some detainees allege that they endured 
electric shock treatments and threats of  sexual torture.32
1.3 A Personal Look at the Black Sites: El-Masri
Macedonian authorities apprehended Khaled El-
-Masri on New Year’s Eve in 2003 as he tried to cross the 
Macedonian-Serbian border.33  The Macedonians held El-
-Masri in a hotel for 23 days.34  On January 23, 2004, men 
in civilian clothes entered the hotel room.  The men in 
civilian clothes forced El-Masri to make a statement that 
no one mistreated him during captivity and that he would 
return to Germany soon.35  These men blindfolded El-
-Masri and drove him to an airstrip about an hour away.36 
When the vehicle stopped, the men pulled El-Masri out 
of  the vehicle and led him into a building where they 
beat him, stripped him naked, and sodomized him.37  The 
men removed his blindfold and took a picture, allowing 
El-Masri to see seven or eight men dressed in black and 
wearing ski masks.38  They dressed him in a diaper and 
tracksuit, secured earmuffs over his ears, and blindfolded 
him once again.39  The men dressed in black dragged El-
-Masri to a plane and sedated him.40  When he awoke, 
El-Masri realized that, instead of  flying to Germany,41 his 
captors took him to Kabul, Afghanistan.42  
are such that it can be used in combination with other corrective 
and coercive techniques.”); see Red Cross Report, supra note 2. (“In 
each case, the person to be suffocated was strapped to a tilting bed 
and a cloth was placed over the face, covering the nose and mouth 
Water was then poured continuously onto the cloth, saturating it and 
blocking off  any air so that the person cannot breathe.  This form 
of  suffocation induced a feeling of  panic and the acute impression 
that the person was about to die.”)
29 See CIA Report, supra note 4, page 9.
30 See CIA Report, supra note 4, page 9.
31 See CIA Report, supra note 4, page 9.
32 See Blanc, supra note 10. (“Plaintiff  Ahmed Agiza alleged that 
he was ‘severely and repeatedly beaten and subjected to shock 
through electrodes attached to his ear lobes, nipples, and genitals’. 
Another plaintiff, Elkassim Britel, alleged that he was ‘deprived of  
sleep and food and threatened with sexual torture, including sodomy 
with a bottle and castration.’”)
33 El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F.Supp. 2d 530, 532 (E.D.Va. 2006).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 533.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 El-Masri at 533.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
In Kabul, the men beat El-Masri before putting him 
in a “small, cold cell.”43  Over the next four months, in-
terrogators – including Americans – questioned him re-
lentlessly about his “alleged association with terrorists.”44 
Two of  the men identified themselves as Americans, and 
El-Masri begged for release, a criminal conviction, or the 
ability to call the German government.45  Eventually, El-
-Masri’s captors released him.46  They put El-Masri on 
a plane to Albania, and left him on the side of  a road.47 
He made it back to Germany with the help of  Albanian 
authorities.48  El-Masri filed suit in the Eastern District 
of  Virginia against multiple Americans for the extraor-
dinary rendition he experienced.49
2. does extrAordinAry rendition breAK the 
lAW?
The American extraordinary rendition program 
sparked debate the minute its existence became public 
knowledge.  The extreme techniques used by the ex-
traordinary rendition program’s interrogators draw the 
most controversy because many believe them to amount 
to torture.50  On the opposite side of  that coin, the ex-
traordinary rendition program has also received strong 
support, particularly since the terrorist attacks in New 
York City on September 11, 2001.  Additionally, the Bush 
Administration in particular touted the necessity of  the 
extraordinary rendition program,51 despite its creation 
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 El-Masri at 533.
46 Id. at 534.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 535.
49 El-Masri filed a civil suit in the Eastern District of  Virginia. 
The court dismissed the suit when the defendants raised the state 
secrets defense.
50 See Red Cross Report, supra note 2. (“The general term ‘ill-treat-
ment’ has been used throughout the following section, however, it 
should in no way be understood as minimi[z]ing the severity of  the 
conditions and treatment to which the detainees were subjected. 
Indeed as outlined in Section 4 below, and as concluded by this re-
port, the ICRC clearly considers that the allegations of  the fourteen 
include descriptions of  treatment and interrogation techniques – 
singly or in combination – that amounted to torture and/or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.”)
51 See Grey, supra note 12. (“’We have put this program in place 
for a reason,’ Bush told reporters.  ‘When we find someone who 
may have information regarding a potential attack on American, you 
bet we’re going to detain them, and you bet we’re going to question 
them’.”)
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during the Clinton Administration.52   The competing 
values of  human rights and national security build into a 
significant tension between achieving victory in the War 
on Terrorism and meeting the human rights obligations 
imposed by international law.  Extraordinary rendition 
supporters place a premium on national security and pre-
venting another terrorist attack on American soil.53  This 
belief  justifies the black sites’ extreme techniques as an 
effective way to reach the goal.54  On the other hand, 
human rights groups claim that the extreme techniques 
are not as effective as they could be and that using the 
techniques is not worth the risks.55
2.1 Is it Torture?
Over the last six years, individuals and organizations 
have debated whether the interrogation techniques used 
at the CIA’s black sites equate to torture or not.  Article1, 
paragraph 1 of  the Torture Convention defines torture as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person 
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third 
person information or a confession . . . or intimidating 
or coercing him or a third person, for any reason 
based on discrimination of  any kind, when such pain 
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of  or 
with the consent or acquiescence of  a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity.56
America is a party to the Torture Convention,57 and 
submitted a reservation to the Committee Against Tor-
ture in order to limit the United States’ obligations un-
52 See Weissbrodt, supra note 6 at 591.
53 See Paul France, Homeland Security Tactics (Fall 2011), 
http://www.abchs.com/ihs/FALL2011/ihs_articles_2.php 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2012)(“Many supporters of  extraordinary ren-
dition use the 9/11 terrorist attack as an argument for coercive inter-
rogation methods claiming the devastating attacks could have been 
averted).
54 See France, supra note 52. (“Vice President Dick Cheney ‘in-
sisted repeatedly that water boarding and other forms of  torture 
worked exceedingly well to extract valuable information as proven 
by the fact that there had been no mass-casualty attacks in the Unit-
ed States since 9/11.’”)
55 See France, supra note 52. (“One of  the most popular argu-
ments against rendition and torture is the idea that illegally detaining 
an individual, denying them basic rights, and sending them to na-
tions that regularly use torture to obtain information is inherently 
against the fundamental values and beliefs of  the American people 
and is against both national and international laws.”)
56 See Torture Convention, supra note 5.
57 See Weissbrodt, supra note 6, at 600 (“The United States ratified 
the Torture Convention in October 1994, having enacted legislation 
to implement the Convention.”)
der the Convention.  This understanding states that:
(a) [W]ith reference to Article 1, the United States 
understands that in order to constitute torture, an act 
must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical 
or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or 
suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused 
by or resulting from: (1)the intentional infliction 
or threatened infliction of  severe physical pain or 
suffering; (2) the administration or application, or 
threatened administration or application, of  mind 
altering substances or other procedures calculated 
to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; 
(3) the threat of  imminent death; or (4) the threat 
that another person will imminently be subject to 
death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the 
administration or application of  mind altering 
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt 
profoundly the senses or personality. 
(b) That the United States understands that the 
definition of  torture in Article 1 is intended to 
apply only to acts directed against persons in the 
offender’s custody or physical control.58
Under a literal reading of  both Article 1 and the 
United States’ understanding, the acts described in Sec-
tion I59 must amount to torture.60  Under a CIA official’s 
admission in a memo detailing the techniques used at 
the black sites, the goal of  the interrogations is to create 
the learned helplessness and dependence necessary to 
gather intelligence.61  Rarely do individuals engaging in 
questionable behavior spell out their intent so clearly 
and this purpose falls squarely within the realm of  the 
Torture Convention.  The techniques outlined in the 
redacted CIA memo62 and quantified in the Red Cross 
Report63 meet three of  the four options specified by the 
United States’ understanding of  torture.64  Taking the 
clear intent and specific acts together, it is more than 
clear that the interrogation techniques employed at the 
CIA black sites constitute torture.  
58 See Weissbrodt, supra note 6, at 600 (Citing Cong. Rec. S17486-
01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)(U.S. reservations, declarations, and un-
derstandings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.)
59 Section I, supra.
60 See Sadat, supra note 10 at 1201. (There they are detained, inter-
rogated, often tortured, and sometimes killed.7 The stories of  the 
individuals “outsourced” as a result of  the U.S. rendition program 
are lurid in their details, involving hooded detainees, who are spirited 
away in the dead of  night and sent in chartered aircrafts to remote 
countries where they typically suffer torture and maltreatment.)
61 See CIA Report, supra note 4.
62 See CIA Report, supra note 4.
63 See Red Cross Report, supra note 2.
64 See Weissbrodt, supra note 6 at 591.
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2.2  Is it Simply Intense Interrogation?
The Torture Convention builds in an alternative pre-
ventative measure for acts that do not quite meet the level 
of  torture defined in Article 1.65  For those who maintain 
that the techniques used at the black sites are nothing more 
than intense interrogation techniques, Article 16 provides 
the alternative to Article 1.66  Article 16 requires State Par-
ties to prevent “other acts of  cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture 
as defined in [A]rticle 1, when such acts are committed 
by or at the instigation of  or with the consent or acquies-
cence of  a public official or other person acting in official 
capacity.”67  Extended exposure to white noise,68 light,69 
prolonged nakedness,70 sleep deprivation,71 a liquid diet,72 
and the physical force certainly rises to the level of  “cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,”73 if  they 
do not meet the definition of  torture.74  Furthermore, the-
se interrogation techniques came about at the insistence 
of  public officials.  Even if  the interrogation techniques 
do not rise to the level of  torture, they certainly fall well 
within the range of  Article 16.75
2.3 Do Black Sites Fall Outside of Scope of the 
Torture Convention?
Comparing the acts of  extraordinary rendition to 
the articles of  the Torture Convention, there are not as 
many express violations as could be expected.  Certain-
ly, express violations exist, as indicated in the previous 
section.76  Yet, reading through the Red Cross Report on 
the experiences of  fourteen “high value detainees,”77 the 
CIA Report detailing the interrogation techniques used 
at black sites,78 and El-Masri’s personal account creates 
the impression that there is no legal argument available 
to proponents of  the extraordinary rendition black sites. 
65 See Torture Convention, supra note 5.
66 See Torture Convention, supra note 5.
67 See Torture Convention, supra note 5, at Art. 17.
68 See CIA Report, supra note 4, page 5.
69 See CIA Report, supra note 4, page 5.
70 See CIA Report, supra note 4, page 6.
71 See CIA Report, supra note 4, page 6.
72 See CIA Report, supra note 4, page 6.
73 Supra note 60.
74 Supra note 50.
75 See Torture Convention, supra note 5, at Art. 16.
76 Supra Section II, subsection A.
77 See Red Cross Report, supra note 2.
78 See CIA Report, supra note 4.
Members of  the Bush administration advanced the 
argument that “foreign nationals held at [black site] fa-
cilities, outside U.S. sovereign territory, are unprotected 
by federal or international laws.”79  In fact, Article 2 re-
quires Convention signers to “take measures to prevent 
acts of  torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”80 
The phrase “territory under its jurisdiction” also appears 
in three81 additional articles to the Torture Convention 
that further set out a State Party’s obligations.  
The black sites exist outside of  the physical bounda-
ries of  the United States.  In fact, black sites are located 
within other countries, such as Afghanistan82 - certain-
ly not a “territory under [American] jurisdiction.”83  As 
a result, some potential for a very strict interpretation 
of  the Torture Convention exists.  Under this narrow 
reading, so long as American officials do not torture 
people – in this case, the suspected terrorists captured 
through the extraordinary rendition program – within 
the physical borders of  America, there is no violation 
to the Torture Convention.  These extraterritorial loca-
tions are in other countries, countries that certainly are 
not within a “territory under [American] jurisdiction.”  
As described in Section I,84 Americans run the bla-
ck sites, even though they are located within another 
country.  Not only do statements made by former “high 
value detainees”85 show this, but CIA officials have also 
made it clear that these facilities are American-run.86  As 
for Guantanamo Bay, American courts have recounted 
how the United States government acquired the proper-
ty and have begun extending small amounts of  rights 
to the facility’s detainees.  As a result, it is quite a leap 
to argue that the black site facilities are not under the 
“territory under [American] jurisdiction” designation. 
Americans established and operated the facilities, acting 
under orders from high-ranking officials.  Any torture 
there constitutes a violation of  the Torture Convention. 
79 See Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
80 See Torture Convention, supra note 5, at Art. 2.
81 See Torture Convention, supra note 5, at Art. 5, Art. 7, Art. 11.
82 See Grey, supra note 12. (“One of  them, located just outside 
Kabul, was known as the “dark prison.” By early 2003, the United 
States was negotiating secret agreements with governments in East-
ern Europe to set up black sites on their territory. A report this 
summer by the Council of  Europe declared it had proof  of  two 
CIA black sites, one on the east coast of  Romania, the other at an 
airbase in Poland.”)
83 See Torture Convention, supra note 5.
84 Supra Section I.
85 Supra note 14; supra note 2.
86 See CIA Report, supra note 4.
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One easily arrives at this conclusion through the Tor-
ture Convention’s express purpose to end torture glo-
bally.  Reviewing the first sixteen articles, it is abundantly 
apparent that the Convention’s designers and drafters 
meant to eradicate torture worldwide.  This intent ma-
nifests itself  as early as Article 2 of  the Torture Conven-
tion, which establishes that there are “no exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever” that warrant using torture.87 
Beyond the declaration that no circumstance warrants 
torture, the Convention also forbids orders from high-
-ranking officers or officials to justify torture.88  The no 
exceptions requirements work hand-in-hand with later 
provisions in the Convention that mandate every State 
Party to institute training and education on torture and 
non-torturous techniques for every person involved de-
tainee, arrestee, or prisoner treatment.89  
2.4 Do Black Sites Invite Retaliation?
In addition to violating the Torture Convention, 
America’s use of  extraordinary rendition could be coun-
terproductive to its very goal – preventing more terro-
rist attacks on American soil.  As the introductory quote 
indicates, when a government breaks the law, it invites 
lawlessness.90  Put in the context of  the extraordinary 
rendition program, the actions and techniques utilized 
invite retaliation.91  Although there has not been a ma-
jor terrorist attack on American soil since September 
11, 2001, the hostility built up by abducting individuals, 
torturing them, interrogating them, and holding many 
of  them indefinitely is not something to take lightly.92
87 See Torture Convention, supra note 5, at Art. 2, ¶ 2.
88 See Torture Convention, supra note 5, at Art. 2, ¶ 3.
89 See Torture Convention, supra note 5,, at Art. 10, Art. 11.
90 Supra note 8.
91 See Grey, supra note 12. (Former FBI special agent Jack Cloo-
nan [said,] “The thing you saw in Africa where people are being held 
incommunicado and have no legal representation and potentially 
abused, is unacceptable.  You’re setting yourself  up for revenge by al 
Qaeda and other Islamists.”)
92 See Grey, supra note 12. (“We really have created a mess here, 
a terrible mess,” says Lawrence Wilkerson, who served in the U.S. 
State Department during the Bush administration. “For the people 
who are involved in it.  For the legal system that will have to sort it 
out, under a new president.  For the country.  For our reputation. 
For our prestige around the world.  This has been incredibly damag-
ing.”); Supra note 1 at 274 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438 at 484-485 (1928) 
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials 
shall be subjected to the same rules of  conduct that are commands 
to the citizen. In a government of  laws, existence of  the govern-
ment will be imperilled if  it fails to observe the law scrupulously. 
3. solutions For blAcK sites
The United States government institutionalized 
torturing “high value detainees” at CIA-run facilities 
across the globe in order to break up terrorist cells in 
the Middle East and to prevent future terrorist attacks. 
This practice is in direct violation of  multiple require-
ments within the Torture Convention, and the United 
States must correct the situation.  Any solution to this 
problem must balance to diametrically opposed view-
points in order to be successful.  
One segment of  the nation’s population accepts the 
War on Terrorism as it is, including potential torture.93 
This “ends justify the means” has an extreme impact on 
the extraordinary rendition program.  It single-handedly 
lead to removing the safeguards from the program.94  
On the other hand, another segment of  the popula-
tion does not believe that the program is worth the hu-
man rights interests and Torture Convention violations. 
As evidenced by the Red Cross report and many other 
individuals, organizations, and countries outside the 
United States fall in line with this viewpoint.95  Althou-
gh these two positions are contradictory to one another, 
policy makers must address both in order to produce a 
viable solution to the black sites.  
To further complicate finding a workable solution, in-
ternational solutions are problematic at best.  Many coun-
tries disregard their obligations under international law. 
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good 
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is conta-
gious. If  the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt 
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites 
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of  the criminal law the 
end justifies the means— to declare that the government may com-
mit crimes in order to secure the conviction of  a private criminal— 
would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine 
this court should resolutely set its face.
93 See Weissbrodt, supra note 6, at 590. (“One former CIA official 
argued that ‘the rendition program has been the single-most suc-
cessful American counterterrorism program since 1995.’”)
94 See Peter Johnston, Leaving the Invisible Universe: Why All Vic-
tims of  Extraordinary rendition Need a Cause of  Action Against the United 
States, 16 J.l. & Pol’y 357, 364 (2007). 
[T]hese early extraordinary renditions still had more safeguards than 
the programs used today: every rendered individual was convicted 
in absentia, and all renditions were approved by CIA legal counsel 
on the basis of  a substantive dossier.  After the September 11, 
2001 attacks, however, the extraordinary rendition program 
changed drastically . . . The initial safeguards were eliminated due 
to the intense pressure on the CIA after September 11 to prevent 
another potential attack.
95 See Red Cross Report, supra note 2.
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The arguments America put forth justifying the extraor-
dinary rendition program, for example, make light of  the 
Torture Convention.  When nations do not actually abide 
by the treaties and conventions they sign, it diminishes 
the likelihood of  utilizing international remedies.  
As a result, this section sets forth a suggested plan 
to rectify the extraordinary rendition program’s wron-
gs and removes the incentives for continued use of  the 
program. The potential solutions, most of  which are 
American created and executed, will work best if  used in 
conjunction with one another; however, each would pro-
duce positive results on its own.  The potential solutions 
will work primarily to create more accountability for pu-
blic officials who authorize extraordinary rendition.
3.1 Providing a Remedy for Victims
If  the American government – through the judicial 
process – truly offered extraordinary rendition victims 
a remedy, it would help create a disincentive to continue 
the program.  Further, it shows a concerted effort to 
rectify the grave breech to human rights interests crea-
ted with the black sites, which is an equally important 
consideration and an essential first step forward.  Finally, 
this step would also help put the United States more in 
line with its obligations under the Torture Convention. 
The Torture Convention requires State Parties like the 
United States96 to provide a remedy to anyone tortu-
red by a State actor.97  The United States could better 
provide a civil remedy to the individuals who endured 
the extraordinary rendition program by altering how the 
state secrets privilege gets asserted and by removing the 
effects of  Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority.98
3.1.1 The State Secrets Privilege
Several former high value detainees like El-Masri99 
have filed legal actions against government actors in the 
United States.  In each instance, trial judges dismissed 
the suits before trial.  The extraordinary rendition victi-
ms appeal these dismissals;100 however, appellate courts 
96 America’s own federal law is supposed to afford torture victims 
a remedy.  Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
97 See Torture Convention, supra note 5, at Art. 12, Art. 13, Art. 
14.
98 Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012).
99 Supra Section I.
100 See El-Masri, supra note 32.
uphold the lower decisions.101  These suits typically 
get dismissed because the defendants assert the state 
secrets privilege or for other extremely technical, pro-
cedural reasons.102  Men like El-Masri103 may be able to 
bring forth an action initially, but these suits do not have 
a real opportunity to move forward.  As a result, the in-
dividuals who experienced the extraordinary rendition 
wind up without an adequate remedy.  
In reality, judges dismiss the suits before thoroughly 
considering the validity of  the claims in the complaints. 
This is particularly the case with suits dismissed by 
the state secrets privilege.  When El-Masri, detailed in 
Section I,104 filed suit against American men and cor-
porations he believed participated in his extraordinary 
rendition, the court did not determine the validity or 
truthfulness of  El-Masri’s complaint because the defen-
dants asserted the state secrets privilege to all of  the 
claims.  Instead, the court dismissed the case because 
“any answer to the complaint by the defendants risks 
the disclosure of  specific details about the rendition 
argument.”105  
Maher Arar encountered a similar issue when he fi-
led suit against the men who participated in his extraor-
dinary rendition.  Arar filed suit against federal officials 
for relief  under the Torture Victim Protection Act and 
under the Fifth Amendment for his detention in the 
United States and his torture and detention in Syria.106 
The district court dismissed all four of  Arar’s claims; 
however, the court allowed Arar to re-plead the claim 
that American officials violated his due process rights 
in the United States.107  Arar appealed, and the appellate 
court affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss all 
four claims.108  Just like the El-Masri court, this court 
asserted that the judicial branch has no authority to pro-
vide a remedy to people who have endured extraordi-
nary rendition and torture in the course of  the War on 
Terrorism.109  
Despite a swift dismissal and an unwillingness to 
create a remedy, the El-Masri court acknowledged the 
101 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
102 See El-Masri, supra note 32; see Arar, supra note 100.
103 Supra Section I.
104 Supra Section I.
105 See El-Masri at 539.
106 See Arar at 567.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 581.
109 Id.
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need for one.110  This opens the door for creating a 
remedy.  Courts do not have to dismiss claims simply 
because the defendants validly assert the state secrets 
privilege.  The doctrine itself  allows claims to continue 
forward even with a properly asserted and accepted 
state secrets defense.  As indicated in El-Masri, when 
government officials assert the state secrets privilege, 
the court has discretion to “proceed in some fashion 
that adequately safeguards any state secrets.”111  The 
standard for determining the necessity of  dismissing 
the case rests on whether or not “there is ‘no way [the] 
case could be tried without compromising sensitive mi-
litary secrets, a district court may properly dismiss the 
plaintiff ’s case.’”112
Thoroughly dismissing the victims’ suits because 
of  a validly asserted state secrets privilege is not the 
way to handle these cases, especially with the legitimate 
need described in El-Masri.  When courts dismiss the 
suits, it denies victims the right to remedy required by 
the Torture Convention.  If, instead, judges removed 
the cases to a hybrid military trial, perhaps both inte-
rests – preserving state secrets and providing a remedy 
– could occur.  This hybrid model would allow for the 
same rules of  civilian trial while operating in a closed 
proceeding.  It also shows a clear intent on the Ameri-
can government’s part to rectify a long line of  abuses 
justified by preventing terrorism. 
3.1.2 The Palestinian Authority Decision
Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority is a landmark change 
in providing torture victims across the board a remedy 
under the TVPA, despite being a recent decision.  The 
United States Supreme Court held that the TVPA only 
imposes liability on natural people.113  In the majority 
110 See El-Masri at 535. 
…if  El-Masri’s allegations are true, or essentially true, then all fair-
minded people, including that who believe state secrets must be 
protected, that this lawsuit cannot proceed, and that renditions 
are a necessary step to take in this war, must also agree that El-
Masri has suffered injuries as a result of  our country’s mistake 
and deserves a remedy.  Yet it is also clear from the result reached 
here that the only sources of  that remedy must be the Executive 
Branch or the Legislative Branch, not the Judicial Branch.
111 See El-Masri at 535.
112 See El Masri 538 (citing sterling, 416 f.2d at 347-48, quoting 
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l., Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir. 
1985)).
113 See Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, supra note 97 at 1705 
(2012). (“We hold that the term ‘individual’ as used in the Act en-
compasses only natural persons. Consequently, the Act does not im-
opinion, Justice Sotomayor confirmed two lower court 
decisions to dismiss this case because the Palestinian 
Authority is an organization, not an individual.114  Al-
though a case has not yet gone before the Supreme 
Court, this holding will provide another legal escape 
for corporations who transport detainees to the black 
sites.115  Although corporations like Jeppesen Dataplan, 
Inc., that assisted in transporting the high value detai-
nees have already maintained liability exemption from 
the Alien Tort Statute116 through government inter-
vention and the state secrets doctrine, they now gain 
exemption from the TVPA on their own.  Anyone who 
endured extraordinary rendition and detention at a bla-
ck site is now without a legal remedy from the gover-
nment and any corporation or organization involved. 
Essentially, this United States Supreme Court decision 
removes disincentive for corporate participation in ex-
traordinary rendition – there will be no backlash, crimi-
nally or civilly, for assisting in detainee transportation, 
thus allowing corporations to continue to assist with 
extraordinary renditions.  
If  the court reversed the effects of  Mohamed v. Palesti-
nian Authority or if  the legislature passed an amendment 
to the TVPA, then, perhaps, the former detainees could 
exercise the full extent of  their judicial rights.  Allowing 
detainees to utilize this avenue for a remedy would also 
help put the United States in line with its obligations 
under the Torture Convention, as described in Section 
II.117  This could also help the United States to show its 
pose liability against organizations.”)
114 Id. at 1703-04.  (“The District Court dismissed the suit, con-
cluding, as relevant here, that the TVPA’s authorization of  suit 
against ‘[a]n individual extended liability only to natural persons. 
The United States Court of  Appeals for the District of  Columbia 
circuit affirmed.  Held: As used in the TVPA, the term ‘individual’ 
encompasses only natural persons.  Consequently, the Act does not 
impose liability against organizations.”)
115 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1075 
(Court of  Appeals, Ninth Cicuit 2010).  
The complaint asserts ‘Jeppesen [Dataplan, Inc., a U.S. corporation] 
played an integral role in the forced’ abductions and detentions 
and ‘provided direct and substantial services to the United 
States for its so-called ‘extraordinary rendition program,’ thereby 
‘enabling the clandestine and forcible transportation of  terrorism 
suspects to the secret overseas detention facilities.’  It also alleges 
that Jeppesen provided this assistance with actual or constructive 
‘knowledge of  the objectives of  the rendition program,’ including 
knowledge that the plaintiffs ‘would be subjected to forced 
disappearance, detention, and torture’ by U.S. and foreign 
government officials.
116 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
117 Supra Section II.
TU
CK
E
R,
 K
ait
lyn
 E
. A
bd
uc
tio
n,
 T
or
tu
re
, I
nt
er
ro
ga
tio
n:
 A
n 
A
rg
um
en
t A
ga
in
st
 E
xt
ra
or
di
na
ry
 R
en
di
tio
n.
 R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
10
, n
. 2
, 2
01
3 
p.
 1
40
-1
53
151
commitment to rectifying the wrongs of  the extraordi-
nary rendition program.  
3.2 A Return to Former Policies
In addition to creating a disincentive for using ex-
traordinary rendition in the War on Terrorism, America 
can also distance itself  by returning to older practices. 
The United States government endorsed other policies 
for bringing foreign, out-of-the-country individuals 
to justice in its borders.  For more than a century, the 
government condoned gaining jurisdiction over defen-
dants through the irregular rendition process.  Additio-
nally, the extraordinary rendition program began as a 
far more stringent operation than it became after the 
September 11, 2001, attacks.  Both of  these practices, 
though problematic, provide a much better option to 
preventing another terrorist attack without completely 
sacrificing human rights obligations under the Torture 
Convention.
3.2.1 Irregular Rendition
America can distance itself  from extraordinary 
through a return to irregular rendition.118  As a default 
policy, irregular rendition is by no means a perfect 
answer.  Irregular rendition comes with its own laundry 
list of  criticism119 and international law issues.120  These 
potential problems, however, are less severe than ex-
traordinary rendition’s human rights concerns and in-
ternational law violations.
The United States Supreme Court first approved 
the use of  irregular rendition in Ker v. Illinois.121  Ulti-
mately, the United States Supreme Court opted not to 
decide “the question of  how far [Ker’s] forcible seizure 
in another country, and transfer by violence, force, or 
118 Supra Section 1.
119 Supra note 1 at 272.  This doctrine “reward[s] police brutality 
and lawlessness in some cases.”
120 Supra note 1.
121 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 438 (1886).  The trial court convict-
ed Frederick Ker, the defendant, of  larceny.  Before trial, Ker fled 
the United States and hid in Peru.  The United States government 
issued an extradition order to a Pinkerton agent, who was charged 
with traveling to Peru and bringing Ker back to the United States 
for trial.  When the Pinkerton agent arrived in Peru, the country was 
engulfed in war.  As a result, the Pinkerton agent did not execute the 
extradition order through the Peruvian government, and, instead, 
abducted Ker.  The agent brought Ker back to the United States 
through an “irregular rendition.”
fraud to this country, could be made available to resist 
trial in the state court.”122  To justify the decision, the 
Court stated that they “do not see that the constitution 
or laws or treaties of  the United States guaranty [Ker] 
any protection.”123  Justice Miller, however, did look to 
other countries’ positions on extraordinary rendition’s 
effect on jurisdiction before shifting gears in this opi-
nion.  This Court discussed utilizing the “bad capture, 
good detention” reasoning taken from other courts,124 
and stated that “such forcible abduction is no sufficient 
reason why the party should not answer when brought 
within the jurisdiction of  the court which has the right 
to try him for such an offense, and presents no valid 
objection to his trial in such court.”125
The United States Supreme Court denied Ker’s as-
signments of  error and upheld the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s decision.  Even though the Ker decision did not 
explicitly decide the particular issue of  whether or not 
an extraordinary rendition voids an American court’s 
jurisdiction, many court decisions have cited Ker as the 
beginning of  the rule to allow any individual brought 
to court through extraordinary rendition to stand trial. 
By returning to this procedure instead of  using ex-
traordinary rendition, America removes incentive or 
temptation to use harsher interrogation techniques.  The 
individuals rendered cycle through the American judicial 
system, maintained by certain trial standards, instead of  
detention at facilities operating outside the law.   
3.2.2 Original Extraordinary Rendition
The United States government could also opt to 
reinstate the extraordinary rendition safeguards and 
practices in place prior to the September 11, 2001, atta-
cks.  Although the original program still involved captu-
ring suspected terrorists and rendering them to foreign 
countries for interrogation, each person subjected to 
an extraordinary rendition also received a trial in ab-
sentia.126  Additionally, the CIA’s legal counsel approved 
122 Id. at 443.
123 Id.
124 Ex parte Scott, 9 Barn. & C. 446, (1829); Lopez v. Sattler’s 
Case, 1 Dearsl. & B. Cr. Cas. 525; State v. Smith, 1 Bailey, 283 (1829); 
State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118, (1835); Dow’s Case, 18 Pa. St. 37, (1851); 
State v. Ross, 21 Iowa, 467, (1866); The Richmond v. U. S., 9 Cranch. 
102.
125 See Ker at 443.
126 See Johnston, supra note 10 at 364.
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every single individual for the extraordinary rendition 
program based on a substantive dossier.127  
Under this program, the CIA employed safeguards 
that kept several important checks on the system.  Due 
to the requisite approval prior to subjecting anyone to an 
extraordinary rendition, the United States government 
avoided abducting innocent people, such as El-Masri or 
Maher Arar.  By putting these cases through trial, even 
in absentia, each instance of  extraordinary rendition re-
ceived a certain amount of  due process.  Adding even 
a minimal amount of  due process to the extraordinary 
rendition program helps to remove the incentive to en-
gage in behaviors that violate international laws. 
3.3 An International Option: Amending the Tor-
ture Convention
In order to prevent further abuse under the guise of  
a legal loophole,128 the Torture Committee must amend 
the Torture Convention to make it absolutely clear that 
torture at the insistence of  any government official 
counts, regardless of  location.  The phrase “territory 
under its jurisdiction”129 needs its own definition in a 
new paragraph under Article 1.  This definition must 
state that any facility set up or operated by the agents 
of  one State Party, regardless of  this facility’s physical 
location within another country’s borders, constitutes 
territory under that State Party’s jurisdiction.  The defi-
nition must go on to incorporate the language in Article 
5 to include “on board a ship or aircraft registered in 
that State.”130  
By adding this language to the Torture Convention, 
the Committee Against Torture gains a foothold against 
American arguments that black sites do not constitute 
a violation.131  By taking the proverbial “wind out of  
the sails” of  these arguments, the Committee Against 
Torture assumes a position to better prosecute legally 
manipulated violations.  The Committee Against Tortu-
re already ruled that assurances that a receiving country 
will not torture an individual picked up through extraor-
127 Id.
128 See Fact Sheet, supra note 11. “Foreign nationals held at [black 
site] facilities, outside U.S. sovereign territory, are unprotected by 
federal or international laws.”
129 See Torture Convention, supra note 5.
130 See Torture Convention, supra note 5, at Art. 5.
131 Supra Section II.
dinary rendition do not create immunity.132  The Com-
mittee Against Torture desperately needs to be able 
to combat both forms of  the American extraordinary 
rendition program.  With these linguistic changes, the 
Committee can meet this goal and make it abundantly 
clear that torture of  any kind, under an circumstance 
violates the Torture Convention.  
As necessary as this potential solution is, it is by 
no means without flaws.  The language of  the Torture 
Convention, even if  amended, could still be subject to 
legal manipulation. Countries party to the Torture Con-
vention still have the ability to claim that the Conven-
tion is not self-executing – and, therefore, nonbinding 
– in addition to new arguments about why the program 
still does not violate the Torture Convention.
4. conclusion
Through the extraordinary rendition program, 
agents of  the American government enter into other 
sovereign jurisdictions, kidnap individuals, and render 
them to CIA-run facilities across the globe. There, these 
individuals endure a variety of  “intense interrogation 
techniques” at the hands of  Americans. These techni-
ques are specifically designed or selected to degrade, to 
mentally defeat, and to physically overpower the detai-
nees, for the sole purpose of  uncovering information 
about suspected terrorist activity. Many of  these tech-
niques, particularly waterboarding, have come under 
harsh scrutiny in the international community, which 
believes that the techniques rise to the level of  tortu-
re. The ACLU, the Committee Against Torture, and the 
International Committee of  the Red Cross, specifically, 
denounce the “interrogation techniques” used in the 
black site facilities. Further, these practices rise to the 
level of  torture under the Torture Convention, which 
American officials purport to follow.
 Despite international outcry and outrage within 
the United States, multiple presidential administrations 
authorized or encouraged extraordinary rendition. Pro-
moting the use of  such extreme measures grew in popu-
larity particularly after the terrorist attacks on American 
soil on September 11, 2001. The American government 
actively sought methods and practices to achieve its goal 
132 Supra note 11; Supra Section I.
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to prevent further attacks. It did so, however, by sacrifi-
cing human rights interests and by placing the country 
in jeopardy of  violating its own international treaties. 
Further, setting a precedent that this type of  program 
is acceptable invites retribution – the exact issue sup-
posedly at the heart of  the policy decision to engage in 
extraordinary rendition in the first place.  
Because this program violates human rights and 
establishes a resoundingly negative international pre-
cedent, it must become a less attractive option to the 
American government and, ultimately, must end. To 
meet this end, the American government should pursue 
establishing civil remedies for the extraordinary rendi-
tion program’s victims as a disincentive for continuing 
the program. This is practicable in altering the states se-
cret privilege so that claims related to this program can 
survive to judicial scrutiny and through requiring cor-
porations involved in extraordinary rendition liable for 
their actions. Both of  these options work as disincen-
tives for continuing the use of  extraordinary rendition. 
In addition, the government has two more legitimate 
former practice options – irregular rendition and the 
original extraordinary rendition program – that it could 
use to meet the goal of  preventing another substantial 
terrorist attack on American soil.  Finally, the Com-
mittee Against Torture must amend the Torture Con-
vention in order to ensure that no country party to its 
obligations can legitimately argue that a black site-style 
program is not torture. 
